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RECENT CASES 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER - THE MASSACHUSETTS BuRMA LAW Is 
FOUND TO ENCROACH ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S EXCLUSIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS. -
National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 
1998). 
Courts have traditionally placed the regulation of foreign affairs 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. Recently, 
twenty-three cities and one state have challenged the exclusivity of this 
jurisdiction by enacting selective purchasing laws that prohibit local 
governments from conducting business with companies that "do busi-
ness" with the Union of Myanmar ("Myanmar'} 1 Most notable of 
these laws is the Massachusetts Burma Law ("Burma Law'~.2 Consid-
ering the constitutionality of such selective purchasing laws for the 
first time, the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts in National Foreign Trade Council v. Bakerl correctly held 
that the Burma Law "unconstitutionally impinges on the federal gov-
ernment's exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs."4 However, 
by failing to articulate the specific ways in which the Burma Law had 
"more than an incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,''5 the 
court missed an opportunity to clarify when state regulation becomes 
unconstitutional involvement in foreign affairs. 
On June 25, 1996, the Massachusetts General Assembly enacted 
legislation prohibiting the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its 
agents "from purchasing goods or services from anyone doing business 
with [Myanmar]."6 The Burma Law authorized the Operational 
Services Division (OSD)1 to establish a "restricted purchase list," which 
contained the names of companies that met the statutory definition of 
"doing business with Burma."8 Once a company's name appeared on 
1 See Burma Law Ruling May Affect 46 States, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 1998, at C3. The 
Nation of Burma became known as the Union of Myanmar in 1989. See Colin Bessonette, Q & A 
on the News, ATLANTA}. & CONST., Aug. r8, 1998, at A2. 
2 MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 7 §§ 22G-22M (West 1996). According to Representative Byron 
Rushing, the sponsor of the Burma Law, 13 companies have pulled out of Myanmar since Massa-
chusetts enacted the Jaw. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8-g, National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 
2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) (No. 98-CV-10757-JLT). 
3 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998). 
4 I d. at 291. 
5 Id. (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
6 I d. at 289. 
7 The OSD is a state agency within the Executive Office of Administration and Finance. See 
id. 
8 I d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the restricted purchase list, the Commonwealth could purchase goods 
from that company only in limited circumstances.9 
The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC)10 sought a declara-
tory judgment that the Burma Law was unconstitutional, arguing that 
the law "intrudes on the federal government's exclusive power to 
regulate foreign affairs," "is preempted by a federal statute and an ex-
ecutive order imposing sanctions on Myanmar," and violates the For-
eign Commerce Clause by discriminating against and burdening inter-
national trade. 11 
Chief Judge Tauro struck down the Burma Law as an infringement 
of the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate foreign af-
fairs.12 He applied the test :for foreign affairs regulation established in 
Zschernig v. Miller, 13 which he interpreted as requiring state laws that 
affect "significant issues of foreign policy" to be voided. 14 Finding 
such an effect, Chief Judge Tauro held that the Burma Law did not 
pass the Zschernig test and was therefore unconstitutional. 15 
By failing to articulate the specific ways in which the Burma Law 
had "more than an incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,"16 
the court missed a crucial opportunity to clarify current jurisprudence 
regarding state involvement in foreign affairs. Although Zschernig es-
9 These circumstances included instances when the procurement was essential and the restric-
tion would have eliminated the only bid or would have given rise to inadequate competition; for 
example, when the state purchased particular medical supplies or when no unrestricted bidder 
had made a "comparable low bid or offer." I d. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also MAss. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22H(b), 22!, 22H(d) (West 1996). 
10 The NFTC is a nonprofit organization comprised of 550 U.S. companies involved in inter-
national trade and investment. The organization works to influence policy decisions about inter-
national trade and commerce. See National Foreign Trade Council, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 290; Profile 
of the National Foreign Trade Council (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://usaengage.org/background/ 
nftc.htmi> (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
II National Foreign Trade Council, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 289. 
12 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432, 436 (1968) (stating that "the Constitution entrusts 
[the field of foreign affairs] to the President and the Congress" and that foreign affairs and inter-
national relations are "matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Govern-
ment"); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external affairs is not shared 
by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."); United States v. Belmont, 301 
U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested 
exclusively in the national government."}. Because Chief Judge Tauro did not find the preemp-
tion or Foreign Commerce Clause arguments dispositive, he did not address them in detail. See 
National Foreign Trade Council, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293. 
13 389 U.S. 429 (1968); see National Foreign Trade Council, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291. Zschernig 
involved an Oregon statute that conditioned the ability of a nonresident to inherit property from 
an Oregon resident upon three factors relating to the reciprocal rights of U.S. citizens in the non-
resident's country of origin. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 43o-3r. The Supreme Court found that 
the Oregon decisions were primarily motivated by foreign policy attitudes, and it was this motiva-
tion that the Court held was a matter "for the Federal Government, not for local probate courts." 
I d. at 438. 
14 I d. at 291. 
IS See id. 
16 I d. (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tablished the framework by which courts can test the constitutionality 
of state laws, it did not determine the scope or requirements of this 
frameworkY The need for courts to "draw the lines"18 made it impor-
tant for Chief Judge Tauro to specify what level of generality he used 
in applying Zschernig's effect inquiry. The vagueness within this area 
of jurisprudence fosters inconsistent judicial determinations as to 
which state laws infringe upon the federal government's exclusive for-
eign affairs power. Such inconsistency threatens to grant constitu-
tional validation of some state laws that interfere with a unified na-
tional foreign affairs agenda. 
Chief Judge Tauro's opinion relies heavily on Zschernig, the only 
Supreme Court opinion to invalidate a state law as an impermissible 
infringement upon the federal government's exclusive authority to 
regulate foreign affairs.19 Zschernig held that a state law intrudes into 
foreign affairs regulation when it has more than "some incidental or 
indirect effect in foreign countries" or a "great potential for disruption 
or embarrassment."20 The existence of a foreign affairs purpose21 un-
derlying a state law is often strong evidence of an unacceptable effect 
on foreign affairs. Consequently, the case law since Zschernig has dis-
tinguished between laws with and without a foreign affairs purpose. 22 
Because the Burma Law had a facial foreign affairs purpose23 and the 
17 Consequently, "it will be largely for the courts ..• to develop the distinctions and draw the 
lines that will define the Zschemig limitations on the states." LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164 (1996); see also id. at 163-65, 24o-41; Richard B. 
Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. lNT'L L. 821, 825-26 (1989) 
("But scholars and judges have continued to puzzle over [Zschemig's] reasoning and scope, and, 
in particular, over precisely where and how the courts should draw the line between constitution-
ally permissible and prohibited state and local action."); Carlos M. Vazquez, Verlinden B.V. v. 
Central Bank of Nigeria: Federal Jurisdiction Over Cases Between Aliens and Foreign States, 82 
COLUM. L. REv. 1057, 1071 (1982) ("[Zschemig] leaves unclear whether the Oregon statute was 
invalid because it evinced hostility to certain states, because it affected foreign relations purpose-
fully rather than incidentally, or for some other reason."). 
18 HENKIN, supra note 17, at 164. 
19 See id. at 165. 
20 Zschemig, 389 U.S. at 434-35 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21 A foreign affairs purpose exists in laws that are enacted with the intent to comment on the 
domestic policy of a foreign nation. See id. at 437 ("[I]t seems that foreign policy attitudes ... are 
the real desiderata. Yet they of course are matters for the Federal Government ..•. "). 
22 Cases without a facial foreign affairs purpose generally involve state Jaws that require the 
use of local or national products in fulfilling government contracts. See Trojan Techs., Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990); K..S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Wa-
ter Supply Comm'n of New Jersey, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977); North Am. Salt Co. v. Ohio Dep't of 
Transp., 701 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). Chief Judge Tauro stated that these precedents 
were not persuasive because "they did not single out a specific foreign country for particular 
treatment, as does the Massachusetts Burma Law," essentially holding that the Jack of a foreign 
affairs purpose caused the cases to be less analogous. National Foreign Trade Council, 26 F. 
Supp. 2d at 292. 
23 The Burma Law was "enacted solely to sanction Myanmar for human rights violations and 
to change Myanmar's domestic policies," a clear foreign affairs purpose. National Foreign Trade 
Council, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291. 
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effects of the law were indeterminate, this Comment focuses on those 
cases that involve state acts with a foreign affairs purpose and am-
biguous effects. 
These cases illustrate two different and inconsistent approaches for 
applying the Zschernig effects test: formulating the effects inquiry at 
either a high or low level of generality. Inquiries at a high level of 
generality examine any potential effects that the statute could have on 
U.S. foreign relations. The mere intention of a state to affect a foreign 
country's domestic policies, when examined from a high level of gen-
erality, would be seen as potentially affecting foreign affairs because of 
the possibility that a foreign country could react to a state's commen-
tary. Alternatively, when framing the effects question at a low level of 
generality, courts focus on the actual effects a statute has on a foreign 
country. It is this inconsistency of interpretive approach that Chief 
Judge Tauro failed to address in National Foreign Trade Council, thus 
maintaining the confusion regarding state involvement in foreign af-
fairs. 
The level of generality that the court applies to its effects inquiry is 
particularly important because the validity of a statute turns on the 
finding of foreign affairs effects as defined by Zschernig. If courts 
were to examine state laws or other legal acts at a high level of gener-
ality, all acts that have a facial foreign affairs purpose could be found 
invalid. Alternatively, if the effects inquiry is at a low level of gener-
ality, it will be significantly more difficult to find that state legal acts 
actually or potentially affect foreign affairs. 
The cases examined below involve laws or state actions that have a 
clear foreign affairs purpose; a desire to note disapproval of a foreign 
country's domestic policy motivated each of the laws or state actions. 
Some of the cases implicitly suggest that once a foreign affairs purpose 
is identified, a "great potential for disruption or embarrassment of 
United States foreign policy"24 is automatic. Alternatively, another 
case requires a direct showing of effect within a foreign country. 25 
Courts have generally examined the Zschernig effects inquiry at a 
high level of generality and have consequently found the state action in 
question invalid. In New York Times Company v. New York Commis-
sion on Human Rights,26 the Court of Appeals of New York upheld 
the New York Times's practice of running employment notices submit-
ted by South African employersP The court found that the Republic 
24 National Foreign Trade Council, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 290 (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-
35) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25 See Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. Ct. App. 1989). 
26 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977). 
27 See id. at 964-65. The Commission on Human Rights had ordered the New York Times "to 
cease and desist from printing advertisements" for employment in the Republic of South Africa in 
part because the Commission found that the State of New York created a boycott against South 
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of South Africa could have been offended by the Commission's inquiry 
and that it "might have been an embarrassment to those charged with 
the conduct of our Nation's foreign policy."28 In Tayyari v. New Mex-
ico State University,29 the Regents of New Mexico State University 
passed a motion denying the admission or readmission of students 
whose "home government holds or permits the holding of U.S. citizens 
hostage."30 The United States District Court for the District of New 
Mexico concluded that the motion's "potential effect on this nation's 
management of immigration and foreign affairs would dictate its de-
mise."31 Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson32 involved an 
Dlinois statute that exempted "gold or silver coinage issued by ... any 
foreign country, except the Republic of South Africa" from the state 
occupation and use tax.33 The Dlinois Supreme Court held that the 
statute encroached on the federal government's exclusive foreign af-
fairs power because the statute "creates a risk. of conflict between na-
tions, and possible retaliatory measures."34 In framing the Zschernig 
effects test at a high level of generality, the courts in New York Times, 
Tayyari, and Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. addressed not only 
the possible consequences of the legal decisions, but also the possible 
consequences of the political decisions that led to the legal decisions. 
Alternatively, one court has applied the eff!!cts inquiry at a low 
level of generality. In Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore,35 a 
Baltimore city ordinance required the city to divest all funds invested 
in "banks or fmancial institutions that make loans to South Africa or 
Namibia or companies 'doing business in or with' those countries."36 
The court examined the effects of the Baltimore ordinance37 at a par-
ticularly low level of generality, looking to the specific effects that the 
divestment would have in South Africa. The court found that divest-
ment "has no immediate effect on foreign relations between South Af-
rica and the United States" and "that divestment alone would not 
cause companies to leave South Africa and that the divestment move-
African employers to express the State's disapproval of South Africa's apartheid regime and to 
atte~pt to persuade South Africa to change its apartheid policies. I d. at 965; see id. at 968. 
28 I d. at 969. 
29 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980). 
30 I d. at 1368. 
31 Id. Chief Judge Campos's opinion did not cite evidence that the Regents' motion actually 
caused or could cause strained diplomatic relations with Iran, the plaintiffs' country of origin. 
Instead, the court simply asserted that it disagreed with the defendant's contention that the mo-
tion "will not interfere with federal policy." I d. 
32 503 N.E.2d 300 (lll. 1986). 
33 I d. at 302. 
34 I d. at 307. 
35 562 A.2d 720 (Md. Ct. App. 1989). 
36 I d. at 724. 
37 The city ordinance was an official statement condemning South Africa's domestic policy, 
which caused the ordinance to have a foreign affairs purpose. :J_ee supra note 21. 
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ment does not create political instability in that country."38 These 
findings led the court to conclude that "the Ordinances' impact in 
South Africa is clearly minirnal."39 
Once a court has determined that a law, commission ruling, or or-
dinance has a foreign affairs purpose, framing the Zschernig effects 
inquiry at a high level of generality makes it nearly impossible to find 
that the act does not affect foreign relations. When investigating at a 
low level of generality, however, courts will be less likely to find un-
constitutionality. High level of generality inquiries are normatively 
better in this context because they better protect the federal govern-
ment's exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs. The United 
States of America operates in the international community as one na-
tion. The Constitution supports this strategy by granting the federal 
government the exclusive authority to make treaties and regulate for-
eign commerce.40 Decisions regarding relationships with other nations 
must be made with the interest of the United States as a whole in 
mind and federal control over this process best facilitates that goal. 
Given increasing globalization, however, international issues are be-
coming more important at the local level. While finding better ways to 
infuse local voices into the creation of the national foreign affairs 
agenda is important, increased local interest does not justify allowing 
states to make and enforce their own foreign affairs agendas. 
Although Chief Judge Tauro relied on the Zschernig test and cor-
rectly decided the case, he did not clarify the manner in which the test 
was applied. The opinion merely noted that the Burma Law com-
mented on the domestic policy of Myanmar and that the European 
Union and Association of South East Asian Nations voiced their oppo-
sition to the law in the World Trade Organization.41 However, at no 
point in the opinion did the court clarify that the constitutional status 
of the Burma Law hinged on either of these findings. By failing to ar-
ticulate the level of generality at which he applied the Zschernig ef-
fects test, Chief Judge Tauro simply added another imprecise decision 
to an already confusing jurisprudence addressing state actions and 
federal foreign affairs power. 
38 Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 74-7· 
39 !d. Had the court examined the effects at a high level of generality, it is likely that the court 
would have found the ordinance invalid. 
40 See U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ ro, cl. r; id. § 8, cl. 3· 
41 See National Foreign Trade Council, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291. 
